The defendant, David Cartier, appeals his conviction for aggravated felonious sexual assault based upon a pattern of sexual assault through sexual intercourse. While he concedes that the State proved more than one act of sexual intercourse, he argues that the trial court erred in finding that the State presented sufficient evidence to establish that the sexual intercourse took place over a period of at least two months. We note that the indictment that charged the defendant with pattern sexual assault through sexual intercourse defined the period as "on or between July 1, 2010 and November 30, 2010." We affirm.
To prevail on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant must show that no rational trier of fact, viewing all of the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Noucas, 165 N.H. 146, 151 (2013). When the evidence is solely circumstantial, the defendant must establish that the evidence does not exclude all reasonable conclusions except guilt. State v. Germain, 165 N.H. __, __ (decided November 5, 2013). When the proof includes both direct and circumstantial evidence, the defendant's sufficiency challenge must fail if the evidence, including the jury's credibility determinations, is such that a rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, even if the evidence would support a reasonable conclusion other than guilt if the jury had resolved credibility issues differently. See State v. Saunders, 164 N.H. 342, 351 (2012).
In this case, the defendant argues that the evidence of the time period in which he assaulted the victim by means of sexual intercourse is solely circumstantial and is thus subject to the more stringent standard of review. We disagree that the evidence is solely circumstantial.
The evidence presented to the jury included: (1) the defendant's admission in his confession that he began a sexual relationship with the victim in June 2010 and that it continued until October of that year; (2) the defendant's estimate that he had "sex" with the victim between five and "eight at the most" times during this period; and (3) the victim's testimony that she was sexually assaulted by the defendant on five occasions when she was twelve and that sexual intercourse occurred on each occasion.
Given this testimony, the jury could have believed the victim's testimony that each sexual assault involved the act of sexual intercourse and the defendant's admission that he had sex with the victim over a period of more than two months, see RSA 632-A:1, I-c (2007) ("pattern of sexual assault" includes aggravated felonious sexual assaults committed upon the same victim over a period of two or more months and within a period of five years). See, e.g., State v. Flynn, 151 N.H. 378, 382 (2004) (jury has substantial latitude in determining credibility of witnesses; it may accept some parts and reject other parts of testimony, and adopt one or another inconsistent statements by witnesses).
HICKS, CONBOY and BASSETT, JJ., ...