United States District Court, District of New Hampshire
Harley-Davidson Credit Corp.
RASair, LLC and Mark B. Galvin Opinion No. 2014 DNH 258
Daniel C. Fleming, Esq., Mark B. Galvin, Esq., Kenneth D. Murphy, Esq., Mark W. Thompson, Esq., Micci J. Weiss, Esq.
Landya McCafferty United States District Judge
Harley-Davidson Credit Corporation (“Harley-Davidson”) brought suit against RASair, LLC (“RASair”) and Mark Galvin, alleging claims for breach of contract against both defendants. Default was entered against RASair, and the court granted in part Harley-Davidson’s motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim against Galvin. Galvin moves for reconsideration. Harley-Davidson objects.
On April 24, 2008, RASair entered into a loan with Eaglemark Savings Bank (“Eaglemark”) for $250, 000, for the purpose of purchasing a Cessna 421C, bearing a manufacturer’s serial number 421C0171, and a United States Registration mark N42ILW (the “Aircraft”). The loan was evidenced by an “Aircraft Secured Promissory Note” dated April 24, 2008 (the “Promissory Note”). As security for the loan, RASair granted to Eaglemark a first priority security interest in the Aircraft, including the Aircraft’s airframe, engines, propellers, and record logs. The security interest was evidenced by an “Aircraft Security Agreement, ” also dated April 24, 2008. On the same day, Galvin executed an “Unconditional and Continuing Guaranty, ” in which he personally guaranteed RASair’s performance under the Aircraft Security Agreement and the Promissory Note (the “Guaranty”). The court will refer to the Promissory Note, the Aircraft Security Agreement, and the Guaranty collectively as the “Loan Documents.”
At some point, Eaglemark assigned the Promissory Note and the Aircraft Security Agreement to Harley-Davidson. On approximately August 24, 2010, RASair defaulted on the Promissory Note by failing to pay the amount due.
On September 6, 2011, after several months of discussions with Galvin and in accordance with the terms of the Loan Documents, Harley-Davidson repossessed the Aircraft. Immediately upon repossession, the Aircraft was placed in the custody of Specialty Aircraft Services, Incorporated (“SAS”), a dealer that specializes in the sale of repossessed and foreclosed aircraft. SAS was tasked with selling the Aircraft, and the proceeds of the sale were to be applied to RASair and Galvin’s outstanding debt related to the Aircraft.
While in SAS’s custody, the Aircraft’s audio panel was vandalized. Harley-Davidson had Specialty Aircraft Leasing, Incorporated (“SAL”) repair the audio panel and make several other repairs to improve the condition of the Aircraft. SAL provided an invoice for its repair services, which indicated that the cost for repairing the audio panel was $2, 000.
SAS subsequently sold the Aircraft in November of 2011 for $155, 000. The proceeds of the sale, less expenses, were applied to the obligations owed under the Promissory Note to Harley-Davidson. Harley-Davidson asserted that the remaining balance owed is $108, 681.50, which includes the expenses incurred to repair the Aircraft, other than the cost for repairing the audio panel which was not included. On December 14, 2011, Harley-Davidson mailed to RASair and Galvin letters for “Demand of Repayment of Deficiency.” Neither RASair nor Galvin paid any of the remaining balance. This action followed, and default was entered against RASair.
Harley-Davidson moved for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim against Galvin. Galvin objected, arguing that the Aircraft was not sold in a commercially reasonable manner as required under the Loan Documents and the Uniform Commercial Code. In its order dated September 4, 2014, the court granted Harley-Davidson’s motion, holding that “Galvin has raised no genuine issues of material fact concerning the commercial reasonableness of the disposition of the Aircraft.” Or. (doc. no. 45) at 19.
Galvin moves for reconsideration of the court’s order granting Harley-Davidson’s motion for summary judgment. Harley-Davidson objects.
Standard of Review
In general, “motions for reconsideration are appropriate only in a limited number of circumstances . . . .” United States v. Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2009). Under the Local Rules in this district, “[a] motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of the court, meaning a motion other than one governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 or 60, shall demonstrate that the order was based on a manifest error of fact or law.” L.R. 7.2(d). “A manifest error is plain and undisputable, obvious, or clearly wrong.” McCarthy v. Weathervane Seafoods, No. 10-cv-395-JD, 2011 WL 2559527, at *1 (D.N.H. June 27, 2011). “A motion for reconsideration does not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures, and it certainly does not allow a party to introduce new evidence or ...