Argued October 15, 2014.
Under New Hampshire procedural rule this decision is subject to motion for rehearing, as well as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire reports.
Ransmeier & Spellman, P.C., of Concord ( Daniel J. Mullen on the brief), and Foley & Lardner LLP, of Chicago, Illinois ( John F. Zabriskie on the brief and orally), for the petitioner.
Joseph A. Foster, attorney general ( Richard W. Head, associate attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the respondent.
BASSETT, J. DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, CONBOY, and LYNN, JJ., concurred.
The respondent, the New Hampshire Department of Administrative Services (Department), appeals an order of the Superior Court ( Smukler, J.) granting summary judgment in favor of the petitioner, CaremarkPCS Health, LLC (Caremark). The trial court ruled that certain information constituting trade secrets under the New Hampshire Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), RSA ch. 350-B (2009), is exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law, RSA ch. 91-A (2013 & Supp. 2014). Specifically, the trial court ruled that disclosure of Caremark's trade
secrets by the Department would constitute a " misappropriation" under the UTSA and, therefore, that the subject information is exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. See RSA 91-A:4, I (2013). On appeal, the Department argues that the trial court erred in finding that the UTSA prohibits the Department from disclosing Caremark's trade secrets under the " otherwise prohibited by statute" exemption in RSA 91-A:4, I. We affirm.
The following facts are undisputed. In 2010, the Department issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) for pharmacy benefit management services for the State of New Hampshire's health plan. The RFP, in pertinent part, provided that:
If a request is made to the State to view portions of a proposal that the Vendor has properly and clearly marked confidential, the State will notify Vendor of the request and of the date the State plans to release the records. By submitting a proposal, Vendor agrees that unless the Vendor obtains a court order, at its sole expense, enjoining the release of the requested information, the State may release ...