United States District Court, D. New Hampshire
MCCAFFERTY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
pro se, Baboucar Taal asserts six claims against four
defendants: St. Mary's Bank (“SMB”);
SMB's president, Ronald Covey; SMB's attorney,
Gregory Uliasz; and Judge Gillian Abramson, who has presided
over a case Taal brought in the New Hampshire Superior Court.
Under the aegis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Taal asserts that
defendants violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
(Counts I and III), and that they conspired to violate his
constitutional rights (Counts II and IV). In his remaining
two claims (Counts V and VI), he asserts that defendants are
liable to him for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization (“RICO”) violations. See 18
U.S.C. § 1962. Before the court are two motions to
dismiss, one filed by Judge Abramson, the other filed by SMB,
Covey, and Uliasz (hereinafter “the SMB
defendants”). For the reasons that follow, those two
motions to dismiss are both granted.
facts recited in this section are drawn largely from Judge
DiClerico's January 20, 2014, order on preliminary review
in Taal v. Uliasz, No. 13-cv-545-JD, a case that
Taal brought in this court several years ago.
and his wife, Guylaine, once received a loan from SMB that
was secured by a mortgage. They have also received other
loans from SMB, including at least one that was unsecured,
and have had other accounts with SMB. In 2009, SMB received a
judgment against Taal in an action in the Merrimack District
Court to collect an unsecured debt. Thereafter, Taal
surrendered a recreational vehicle to SMB, which the bank was
supposed to sell to satisfy its judgment. Subsequently, Taal
sued SMB in the Hillsborough County Superior Court. In that
action, 11-C-741, Taal claimed, among other things, that SMB
had not disposed of the RV in a commercially reasonable
Abramson, a defendant in this case, dismissed 11-C-741 on res
judicata grounds. And, in her order of dismissal, she
extended a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction . . . against Taal which enjoined Taal from
contacting [SMB] employees and agents directly, rather than
through counsel, and further enjoined him from harassing and
intimidating certain individuals, including Uliasz's
Taal, slip op. at 4. Taal appealed the order of dismissal to
the New Hampshire Supreme Court (“NHSC”). The
NHSC reversed the dismissal, and remanded, but it also
affirmed Judge Abramson's extension of the injunction
remand, Taal moved for the recusal of Judge Abramson. She
denied his motion. Then, when Taal failed to appear at a
final trial management conference and failed to file a
pretrial statement, Judge Abramson dismissed 11-C-741 again,
in an order dated April 2, 2013.
in 2013, after Taal contacted various SMB employees, SMB
moved for contempt in 11-C-741. This is what happened next:
On October 18, 2013, the superior court found that Taal had
violated the [injunction against contacting SMB employees],
which remained in effect despite the dismissal of Taal's
case, by contacting Ronald Covey, the CEO of [SMB], and
accusing [SMB] of several violations of the law. The court
ordered Taal to pay [SMB] $1, 825 in attorneys' fees
incurred in filing the motion for contempt . . . and in
attending the hearing. After Taal failed to pay the fees, the
court scheduled a show cause hearing to address Taal's
failure to obey the court order, which [was] scheduled for
January 15, 2014.
Taal, slip op. at 6. After that hearing was scheduled, SMB
filed a second motion for contempt.
December 20, 2013, apparently in response to [SMB]'s two
motions for contempt, Taal filed [an] action against Uliasz
and the firm for which he works.” Taal, slip op. at 7.
That action was Judge DiClerico's case, 13-cv-545-JD.
On December 30, 2013, Uliasz, on behalf of [SMB], mailed
Guylaine [Taal] a notice of mortgage foreclosure sale, which
sale [was] scheduled to occur on January 31, 2014. On January
3, 2014, Taal filed a motion for an emergency preliminary
injunction [in 13-cv-545-JD], seeking to enjoin the
preliminary review, Judge DiClerico dismissed Taal's
case, explaining that due to the pendency of Taal's state
court action, i.e., the hearing in 11-C-741 that was
scheduled for January 15, dismissal was required by the
Younger abstention doctrine. SeeYounger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971). And, because he was
dismissing Taal's case, Judge DiClerico also denied
Taal's request for an ...