United States District Court, D. New Hampshire
ORDER
Steven
J. McAuliffe United States District Judge.
In
2014, Gregory Maggi was convicted of numerous criminal
charges, including seven counts of felonious sexual assault
upon a child between the age of 13 and 15, as well as
multiple counts of simple assault and distribution of a
controlled substance (to his victims). He was, however,
acquitted of some charges arising out of that very same
conduct - a fact that prompted this litigation. Maggi was
sentenced to serve no less than 17 and one-half years to 35
years in prison.[1] He was also ordered to have no contact
with his victims or their families. And, he was ordered to
pay restitution to each of his victims in an amount not to
exceed $10, 000 (although the record is unclear, it appears
that there were two victims of Maggi's repeated sexual
assaults). On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
affirmed Maggi's convictions, observing that evidence of
his guilt was “overwhelming.”
The
defendant in this case is one of Maggi's victims. From
her, Maggi seeks $5 million in damages, asserting that she
conspired “with authorities” to deprive him of a
fair trial, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3);
maliciously prosecuted him; and defamed him, in violation of
a state criminal statute. Defendant moves to dismiss each of
Maggi's claims, saying none states a viable cause of
action. That motion is granted.
Discussion
I.
Conspiracy.
Count
one of Maggi's amended complaint alleges that the
defendant violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) by
“conspir[ing] with authorities to deprive Mr. Maggi of
his Constitutional right to a fair trial by changing her
story multiple times, withholding information from the
defense, and by lying to investigators.” Amended
Complaint (document no. 4) at para. 22. That count fails to
plausibly set forth the essential elements of a viable claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Most notably, it lacks a
plausible allegation that there was “some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus behind the conspirators' action.”
Perez-Sanchez v. Pub. Bldg. Auth., 531 F.3d 104, 107
(1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). See also Soto-Padro v. Pub.
Bldgs. Auth., 675 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2012); Aulson
v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996); Veale v.
Furness, No. 10-CV-147-JL, 2012 WL 359700, at *3-4
(D.N.H. Feb. 2, 2012).
II.
Malicious Prosecution.
In
Count Two of his complaint Maggi advances a claim for
“malicious prosecution.”[2] Specifically, he alleges
that the defendant “cooperated with state prosecutors
to bring charges against Mr. Maggi for incidents that did not
occur and should not warrant criminal charges even if they
had been true.” Amended Complaint at para. 24. That
claim falls short for several reasons.
There
are four elements to a viable common law claim for malicious
prosecution:
(1) the plaintiff was subjected to a criminal prosecution or
civil proceeding instituted by the defendant; (2) without
probable cause; (3) with malice; and (4) the prior action
terminated in the plaintiff's favor.
Farrelly v. City of Concord, 168 N.H. 430, 445, 130
A.3d 548, 560 (2015) (citation omitted). Maggi's amended
complaint falls decidedly short and likely fails to
adequately allege even a single essential element of his
claim.
First,
Maggi has pointed to no New Hampshire case law holding that,
for malicious prosecution purposes, a victim “initiates
a criminal proceeding” by making a report to police.
Second, under the circumstances of this case, Maggi's
indictment by a grand jury likely precludes him from
establishing that charges were filed against him without
probable cause. See, e.g., Ojo v. Lorenzo,
164 N.H. 717, 727-28 (2013). See also New Hampshire v.
Maggi, No. 2015-0029 (N.H. Supr. Ct. May 20, 206) at 2
(affirming Maggi's convictions and noting that another
victim of Maggi's sexual assaults corroborated the
defendant's claims and testified that she witnessed Maggi
having sex with the defendant; the existence of probable
cause to charge Maggi did not, therefore, hinge solely upon
the defendant's claims). Third, it is certainly open to
debate whether Maggi's amended complaint adequately
alleges that the defendant acted with the requisite malice
(that is, with a purpose other than bringing a criminal to
justice).[3]
But, in
any event, it is plain that the criminal case against Maggi
did not “terminate in his favor.” At trial, it
was proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he repeatedly
sexually assaulted the defendant, that he committed simple
assault against her, and that he unlawfully provided her with
controlled substances. As a consequence, he will remain
incarcerated for anywhere between 17 and one-half to 35
years. Additionally, Maggi was ordered to pay the defendant
restitution in an amount not to exceed $10, 000. It would
strain the notions of common sense and reasonableness to
conclude that the underlying criminal trial terminated in
Maggi's favor. First, in the context of a malicious
prosecution case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
consistently refers to the favorable termination of a
“proceeding” or “action, ” not a
“claim” or “count.” Consequently, one
must look to the overall outcome of the “proceeding,
” rather than individually assess the import of a
jury's verdict on each particular claim, count, or
charge. Here, the criminal charges against Maggi all arose
out of the same course of conduct - his repeated sexual
assaults upon the defendant. His numerous convictions for
that conduct establish that, as a matter of law, he was not
wrongfully accused or prosecuted. See, e.g.,
Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 1873d Cir. 2009)
(“Consistent with this purpose [of the ‘favorable
termination' requirement], we have held that a prior
criminal case must have been disposed of in a way that
indicates the innocence of the accused in order to satisfy
the favorable termination element.”).[4]
And, of
course, there are compelling public policy reasons to
conclude that, given the particular facts of this case, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court would not view Maggi's
acquittal on a few of the charges against him as representing
a “successful” termination of the criminal
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