APPEAL OF PATRICK A. ROLAND (New Hampshire Department of Safety)
Argued: September 27, 2017
J. MacDonald, attorney general (Matthew T. Broadhead,
assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the
New Hampshire Department of Safety.
Montshire Law, P.L.L.C., of Lebanon (Brad W. Wilder on the
brief and orally), for the respondent.
respondent, Patrick A. Roland, appeals the decision of the
New Hampshire Department of Safety (Department) requiring the
installation of an ignition interlock device in his vehicle
as a condition of restoration of his driver's license.
See RSA 265-A:36-a (2014) (amended 2017). We affirm.
following facts appear in the record. On May 10, 2016, Roland
pleaded guilty to misdemeanor "DWI [Driving While
Intoxicated] First Offense (where second offense within 10
years is on record)." See RSA 265-A:2, :18, V
(2014). The trial court revoked his driver's license for
two years, retroactive to April 2016, and stated that he
"[s]hall not be eligible to seek reinstatement" of
his license "sooner than 2 years." See RSA
2016, the Department issued a notice of hearing to review
Roland's driving record and determine whether, pursuant
to RSA 265-A:36-a, he would be required to install and
maintain an ignition interlock device as a condition of his
license restoration. See RSA 265-A:36-a. The notice
provided that Roland could request a continuance of the
hearing. The record does not demonstrate that he made such a
Department held its hearing in August 2016. At that time, RSA
The commissioner of safety may require an administrative
hearing prior to the restoration of the license or driving
privilege of a person whose license or driving privilege was
revoked or suspended as a result of a conviction of any
offense under RSA 265-A:2 . . . and, upon a finding that the
safety of the person and of other users of the highway would
be enhanced thereby, may order the person, as a condition of
restoration of his or her license or driving privilege, to
install an ignition interlock device or enhanced technology
ignition interlock device in any vehicle registered to that
person or used by that person, for not less than 12 months
nor more than 2 years, subject to the same conditions and
prohibitions as if the interlock was ordered by a court under
the provisions of this subdivision.
thereafter, in October 2016, the hearing examiner issued his
report, which included the following findings of fact: (1)
Roland was convicted of DWI in 2016; (2) his license was
suspended for two years as a result of that conviction; (3)
Roland was convicted of DWI in 2010; (4) his license was
administratively suspended for two years as a result of that
conviction; (5) Roland's 2010 conviction also reflected
"a prior refusal to submit to a chemical test after an
earlier DWI arrest"; and (6) Roland had an
"extensive history of DWI arrests." The hearing
examiner required that, as a condition of license
restoration, Roland install an interlock device for a period
of 12 months from the date of restoration. See id.
Roland filed a motion for rehearing. He asserted that the
facts stated in the report were insufficient to support the
hearing examiner's decision to require the installation
of a device under RSA 265-A:36-a, and that the interlock
issue was not "ripe" for consideration. In
response, the hearing examiner issued a second report,
denying the motion for rehearing and noting that further
review of Roland's driving history had revealed that, in
addition to the multiple DWI convictions referenced in the
first report, Roland had a 1998 DWI conviction. This appeal
chapter 541 governs our review of the hearing examiner's
decision. See RSA 21-P:13, II-a (Supp. 2016); RSA
541:13 (2007). We will not set aside the hearing
examiner's order except for errors of law, unless we are
satisfied, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, that it
is unjust or unreasonable. RSA 541:13. The hearing
examiner's findings of fact are presumed prima
facie lawful and reasonable. See id. In
reviewing the hearing examiner's findings, our task is
not to determine whether we would have found differently or
to reweigh the evidence, but rather, to determine whether the
findings are supported by competent evidence in the record.
See Appeal of Phillips, 165 N.H. 226, 235 (2013). As
the appealing party, Roland has the burden to provide this
court with a sufficient record to decide his issues on
appeal. See Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H.
248, 250 (2004).
first argues that the findings of fact in the hearing
examiner's initial report are insufficient to support the
hearing examiner's determination that "the safety of
[Roland] and of other users of the highway would be
enhanced" by the installation of a device. RSA
265-A:36-a. We disagree. Because Roland has failed to provide
a transcript of the Department hearing, we must assume that
the evidence was sufficient to support these findings.
See Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 720 (2013).
The findings made by the hearing examiner, including a
finding that Roland has an "extensive history of DWI
arrests, " amply support his decision. See RSA
265-A:36-a. Accordingly, we conclude that it was not
unreasonable or unjust for the Department to require Roland
to install a device as a condition of license restoration.
Roland argues that the issue of whether to require the
installation of an interlock device was not "ripe"
for consideration. See Univ. Sys. of N.H Bd. of Trs. v.
Dorfsman, 168 N.H. 450, 455-57 (2015). He argues that
the hearing "should properly be performed closer in time
to when [he] will actually be eligible for restoration of his
driver's license." He contends that a later hearing
would provide him with an "opportunity to submit
evidence that could assist in demonstrating, and even
establishing, that he will not pose a danger to himself or
RSA 265-A:36-a gives the Department broad discretion as to
when to hold a hearing, and whether to require the
installation of an interlock device as a condition of license
restoration. See RSA 265-A:36-a. We will neither
consider what the legislature might have said nor add words
that it did not see fit to include. See Appeal of City of
Concord, 161 N.H. 169, 172 (2010). There is nothing in
the statute that suggests, let alone requires, that the
hearing be held at a particular time. See RSA
265-A:36-a. If the legislature wanted to establish a
mandatory timeframe, it knew how to do so. For example, the
Department must hold a hearing "within 20 days after ...