United States District Court, D. New Hampshire
ORDER
STEVEN
J. MCAULIFFE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), claimant, Timothy Scully,
moves to reverse or vacate the Acting Commissioner's
decision denying his applications for Disability Insurance
Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the
“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 423. The Acting
Commissioner objects and moves for an order affirming her
decision.
For the
reasons discussed below, claimant's motion is denied, and
the Acting Commissioner's motion is granted.
Factual
Background
I.
Procedural History.
In July
of 2014, claimant filed applications for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”), alleging that he was disabled
and had been unable to work since February 22, 2014. That
application was denied on February 18, 2015, and claimant
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”).
On
March 18, 2016, claimant, his attorney, and an impartial
vocational expert appeared before an ALJ, who considered
claimant's application de novo. On April 20, 2016, the
ALJ issued his written decision, concluding that claimant was
not disabled, as that term is defined in the Act, through the
date of his decision. Claimant then requested review by the
Appeals Council, and submitted additional documentation from
Ashok Shah, M.D., in support of his claim. The Appeals
Council denied claimant's request for review, and found
that the additional information provided by claimant did not
show a reasonable probability that, either alone or when
considered with the other evidence of record, would change
the outcome of the ALJ's decision. Accordingly, the
ALJ's denial of claimant's applications for benefits
became the final decision of the Acting Commissioner, subject
to judicial review. Subsequently, claimant filed a timely
action in this court, asserting that the ALJ's decision
is not supported by substantial evidence.
Claimant
then filed a “Motion to Reverse Decision of the
Commissioner” (document no. 9). In response, the Acting
Commissioner filed a “Motion for an Order Affirming the
Decision of the Commissioner” (document no. 11). Those
motions are pending.
II.
Stipulated Facts.
Pursuant
to this court's Local Rule 9.1, the parties have
submitted a joint statement of stipulated facts which,
because it is part of the court's record (document no.
12), need not be recounted in this opinion. Those facts
relevant to the disposition of this matter are discussed as
appropriate.
Standard
of Review
I.
“Substantial Evidence” and Deferential
Review.
Pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court is empowered “to
enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing.” Factual findings
and credibility determinations made by the Commissioner are
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). See also
Irlanda Ortiz v. Secretary of Health & Human
Services, 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991). Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938). Importantly, it is something less than a
preponderance of the evidence, so the possibility of drawing
two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency's finding from being
supported by substantial evidence. Consolo v. Federal
Maritime Comm'n., 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). See
also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
II.
The Parties' Respective Burdens.
An
individual seeking DIB benefits is disabled under the Act if
he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). The Act places a heavy initial burden on the
claimant to establish the existence of a disabling
impairment. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137,
146-47 (1987); Santiago v. Secretary of Health &
Human Services, 944 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1991). To
satisfy that burden, the claimant must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that his impairment prevents
him from performing his former type of work. See Gray v.
Heckler, 760 F.2d 369, 371 (1st Cir. 1985); Paone v.
Schweiker, 530 F.Supp. 808, 810-11 (D. Mass. 1982). If
the claimant demonstrates an inability to perform his
previous work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show
that there are other jobs in the national economy that he can
perform, in light of his age, education, and prior work
experience. See Vazquez v. Secretary of Health &
Human Services, 683 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1982). See
also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(f) and 416.912(f).
In
assessing a disability claim, the Commissioner considers both
objective and subjective factors, including: (1) objective
medical facts; (2) the claimant's subjective claims of
pain and disability, as supported by the testimony of the
claimant or other witnesses; and (3) the claimant's
educational background, age, and work experience. See,
e.g., Avery v. Secretary of Health & Human
Services, 797 F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1986);
Goodermote v. Secretary of Health & Human
Services, 690 F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir. 1982). Ultimately, a
claimant is disabled only if his:
[P]hysical or mental impairment or impairments are of such
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work
but cannot, considering his age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy, regardless of
whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he
lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or
whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
With
those principles in mind, the court reviews claimant's
motion to reverse and the Acting ...