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Jones v. FCI Berlin, Warden

United States District Court, D. New Hampshire

February 7, 2018

Theodore Jones
FCI Berlin, Warden


          Landya McCafferty United States District Judge

         Petitioner Theodore Jones, who is presently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Berlin, brings a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He challenges a decision of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), which determined that Jones should not receive presentence credit for the time he served in state custody with the Connecticut Department of Corrections (“DOC”). Before the court is respondent's motion for summary judgment. Jones objects. For the following reasons, respondent's motion is denied.


         A movant is entitled to summary judgment if it “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).[1] “An issue is ‘genuine' if it can ‘be resolved in favor of either party, ' and a fact is ‘material' if it ‘has the potential of affecting the outcome of the case.'” Xiaoyan Tang v. Citizens Bank, N.A., 821 F.3d 206, 215 (1st Cir. 2016). In reviewing the record, the court construes all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Kelley v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 707 F.3d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 2013).

         Under 18 U.S.C. § 3585, a prisoner “shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences.” 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). In order for the prisoner to be entitled to such credit, the time spent in official detention must have been “as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed” and cannot have been “credited against another sentence.” Id. § 3585(b)(1). The parties agree that Jones's petition is properly before this court, because Jones has exhausted his administrative remedies at the BOP. See Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 349, 358 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that “[o]nce administrative remedies are exhausted . . . prisoners may then seek judicial review of any jail-time credit determination . . . by filing a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241”).


         The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted. In January 2012, Jones began serving a term of special parole on a Connecticut state sentence, which was set to expire in January 2018. Under Connecticut law, special parole is a mandatory period of parole that the defendant must complete after serving his term of imprisonment. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125e.

         On October 2, 2012, Jones was arrested by state authorities for a number of state charges relating to drugs and firearms. On the same day, a parole officer issued a “remand to actual custody order” to the Connecticut DOC. This order directed the Connecticut DOC to hold Jones in custody for violation of the conditions of his special parole. See Conn. Agencies Regs. §§ 54-124a(j)(1)-1(15), 54-124a(j)(1)-4; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-127.

         On April 10, 2013, while still in custody, Jones was indicted on federal drug and firearm charges related to his October 2012 arrest. Later that year, Jones pleaded guilty to two of the federal charges and, on October 8, 2013, he was sentenced to 94 months imprisonment. The federal court recommended to the BOP “[t]hat [Jones] receive credit for time served.” Doc. no. 10-7 at 3 of 4. On October 17, the state charges arising from Jones's October 2012 arrest were dismissed.

         During this time, the proceedings relating to Jones's parole violation remained pending. See Conn. Agencies Regs. § 54-124a(j)(1)-6 (“Parole revocation procedures premised upon criminal misconduct that is the subject of prosecution shall be continued until the criminal matter is disposed.”). On November 25, 2013, a parole revocation hearing was held before a hearing examiner, and Jones admitted that he had violated the terms of his special parole. The hearing examiner made the following recommendation: “This officer recommends revoke and reparole to Mr. Jones' Federal Detainer.” Doc. no. 10-9 at 3 of 3.

         On December 5, 2013, the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles (the “parole board”) appears to have accepted the hearing officer's recommendation, because it issued the following “Board Action” in Jones's case: “Revoked/Reparoled.” Doc. no. 1-2 at 18 of 22. Once special parole is revoked, the parole board is required to issue a mittimus “declaring the cause of commitment and requiring the warden of the correctional institution . . . to receive and keep such person for the period fixed by the judgment of the Board.” Conn. Agencies Regs. § 54-124a(j)(1)-9(p). The mittimus issued in Jones's case, dated December 5, 2013, states that his parole was revoked on December 5, 2013, and orders that Jones be confined until April 4, 2014.

         Federal authorities took custody of Jones on April 10, 2014. Once in federal custody, Jones requested that the BOP credit towards his federal sentence the 428 days that he spent in state custody before his parole revocation. The BOP denied the request because it determined that the time in state custody was “spent serving [the] state parole revocation sentence.” Doc. no. 10-15 at 9 of 9. This petition followed.

         To summarize the relevant dates:

(1) On October 2, 2012, Jones was arrested and held on state drug and firearm charges, and a parole officer issued a “remand to actual custody order” for Jones's ...

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