United States District Court, D. New Hampshire
TOMPSON, PRO SE
MICHAEL J. SCOTT, ESQ.
McCafferty United States District Judge
Tompson, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against Madhu
Gaddam, alleging claims that appear to arise out of the sale
of her home. Gaddam moves to dismiss. Tompson objects.
moves to dismiss Tompson's complaint pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). First, Gaddam
argues that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, both
because the complaint does not present a federal question and
because all “proper” parties are not
diverse. Second, Gaddam argues that, regardless,
the complaint does not state a plausible claim for relief.
purposes of Gaddam's motion, where extrinsic evidence is
not an issue, the standard of review under Rule 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) is the same. Cf. U.S. ex rel. Winkelman v. CVS
Caremark Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 207 (1st Cir. 2016). When
considering motions under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the
court accepts as true the properly pleaded facts and takes
all reasonable inferences from those facts that support the
plaintiff's claims. Mulero-Carrillo v.
Roman-Hernandez, 790 F.3d 99, 104 (1st Cir. 2015);
New England Patriots Fans v. Nat'l Football League,
No. 16-10659-FDS, 2016 WL 3248207, at *2 (D. Mass. June
10, 2016). Based on the properly pleaded facts, the court
determines “whether the factual allegations in the
plaintiff's complaint set forth a plausible claim upon
which relief may be granted.” Foley v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 2014) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Because
Tompson is proceeding pro se, the court construes her
complaint liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
central problem with Tompson's complaint is that there
are insufficient facts to piece together any sort of coherent
narrative. Tompson lists the address of the real property
that is apparently at issue in this case, and states that she
is entitled to assert her rights under the Federal and New
Hampshire Homestead Acts and is entitled to damages for both
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
See doc. no. 1 at 1. She also references a sheriff's sale
notice not being properly served and attaches certain
bankruptcy filings and the sheriff's deed. The majority
of Tompson's complaint cites law related to the Federal
than alleging that diversity jurisdiction exists because
Gaddam is a Massachusetts resident, the complaint contains no
allegations against him. Nor do any of the attachments to the
complaint mention him. Put simply, even assuming the truth
of-and construing liberally-the few factual allegations in
Tompson's complaint, the court is unable to discern any
viable claims against Gaddam.
court, therefore, grants Gaddam's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim without prejudice to Tompson's
ability to file a complaint that sets forth facts sufficient
to state a plausible claim against Gaddam.
foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint (doc. no. 4) is granted without prejudice to
plaintiff's ability to file an amended complaint setting
forth facts sufficient to state a plausible claim against
defendant. Tompson has until December 12,
2018 to file an amended complaint. Failure to file
an amended complaint within this time frame will result in
dismissal of Tompson's complaint with prejudice.