FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
PUERTO RICO [Hon. Jay A. Garcia-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]
L. Pérez-Redondo, Research & Writing Specialist,
with whom Eric A. Vos, Federal Public Defender, and Vivianne
M. Marrero-Torres, Assistant Federal Public Defender, were on
brief, for appellant.
A. Schwartz, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Rosa
Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney,
and Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States
Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.
Howard, Chief Judge, Selya and Barron, Circuit Judges.
BARRON, Circuit Judge.
Reyes-Rivas ("Reyes") challenges his sentence of 77
months of imprisonment on the grounds (1) that he was
improperly subjected to the career offender enhancement,
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, because one of his predicate crimes
did not qualify as a "crime of violence" under the
career offender guideline and (2) that the District Court
impermissibly considered an untranslated Spanish-language
document in violation of the Jones Act, 48 U.S.C. § 864.
For the reasons that follow, we vacate and
remand for further proceedings.
2015, Reyes was indicted in the District of Puerto Rico on
one count of assault with a dangerous weapon, see 18
U.S.C. § 113(a)(3), for stabbing a fellow prisoner with
a "homemade weapon." Reyes pleaded guilty to that
offense, and his case proceeded to sentencing.
April 28, 2016, the Probation Office released a Presentence
Report ("PSR") in Reyes's case. The PSR
classified Reyes as a career offender. See U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1(a). Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), a
"career offender" includes "those defendants
who have two prior convictions, whether for a 'controlled
substance offense,' any 'crime of violence,' or
any combination thereof." United States
v. Steed, 879 F.3d 440, 443 (1st Cir. 2018)
(internal citations omitted).
time of Reyes's sentencing, the career offender guideline
defined a "crime of violence" as:
[A]ny offense under federal or state law, punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that- (1) has as
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another, or (2) is
burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2015). Thus, an offense could fit
within the then-operative "crime of violence"
definition if it were encompassed by that definition's
force clause ("has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another"), enumerated offenses clause ("is burglary
of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives"), or residual clause ("otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another").
determined, without express references to any of the clauses
just referenced, that Reyes qualified as a "career
offender" because he had two prior convictions for
"crimes of violence." Those convictions were a 2014
federal carjacking conviction, see 18 U.S.C. §
2119(1), and a 2012 Puerto Rico conviction for aggravated
battery, see P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 33 § 4750.
determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a
"crime of violence," we apply the "categorical
approach." United Statesv.Dávila-Félix, 667 F.3d 47, 55 (1st
Cir. 2011) (citing Taylorv.United
States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-02 (1990)). Under that
approach, "we look to the statutory definition of the
offense in question, as opposed to the particular facts