United States District Court, D. New Hampshire
Michael Joseph Bergeron, Jr.
State of New Hampshire
MICHAEL JOSEPH BERGERON, JR., PRO SE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
K. JOHNSTONE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Michael Joseph Bergeron, Jr., proceeding in forma pauperis,
has filed a Complaint, Doc. No. 1, that is before this court
for preliminary review, pursuant to LR 4.3(d) and 28 U.S.C.
Preliminary Review Standard
magistrate judge conducts a preliminary review of pleadings
filed in forma pauperis. See LR 4.3(d). The
magistrate judge may recommend to the district judge that one
or more claims be dismissed if, among other things, the court
lacks jurisdiction, a defendant is immune from the relief
sought, or the complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2); LR 4.3(d). In conducting its preliminary review,
the court construes pro se complaints liberally. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
The complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief.
Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91,
102 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
states that the State of New Hampshire, acting through its
Attorney General's office, has unconstitutionally
prosecuted him. He bases this claim on Article III, section 2
of the United States Constitution, which states that The
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over all cases in
which a state is a party. Accordingly, Bergeron asserts, his
convictions in state trial courts are unconstitutional
because he was not tried in the United States Supreme Court.
He seeks compensation and to have his convictions overturned.
42 U.S.C. § 1983
court construes Bergeron's claim for damages as intending
to be asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes
claims for relief filed by plaintiffs alleging that a
defendant acting under color of state law violated their
federal rights. Bergeron has failed to set forth a
constitutional violation. Under our federal system, the
“States possess primary authority for defining and
enforcing the criminal law.” United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91, 109 (1945) (plurality opinion) (“Our national
government is one of delegated powers alone. Under our
federal system the administration of criminal justice rests
with the States except as Congress, acting within the scope
of those delegated powers, has created offenses against the
request for this court to overturn his state court
convictions is barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, which holds that, as a general rule subject to
certain exceptions not relevant here, lower federal courts
cannot review and reverse prior state judgments. See D.C.
Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v.
Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Klimowicz v.
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., No. 17-1916, 2018 WL
5094793, at *2 (1st Cir. Oct. 19, 2018). The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests this court of
jurisdiction over cases brought by parties that lost in state
court, complaining of injuries caused by state court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced, and “‘inviting district court review
and rejection of [the state court's]
judgments.'” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S.
521, 532, (2011) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005));
McKenna v. Curtin, 869 F.3d 44, 47 (1st Cir. 2017).
district judge should dismiss this civil rights action, in
its entirety, based on the issues discussed herein. Any
objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed
within 14 days of receipt of this notice. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); LR 7.2(d). The 14-day period may be
extended upon motion. Failure to file objections within the
specified time waives the right to ...